The Showcases of Dental History - A Time Machine in Miniature at the University of Puerto Rico: Part I.

The evolution of 20-year-old dental museum-like showcases located in the lobby and the main hallway of the School of Dental Medicine, Puerto Rico (PR) are described along with important professionals who impacted on this development.

Securing a lobbying win on XL bully neutering.

Following the introduction of bans on XL bully dogs across Great Britain, and the announcement of restrictions on the breed type in Northern Ireland, we welcomed the extension of the deadlines for neutering XL bullies in England, Wales and Scotland thanks to our campaigning alongside other organisations in the Dog Control Coalition.

Uncovering lobbying strategies in sustainable finance disclosure regulations using machine learning.

PURPOSE: We analyse lobbying behaviour by using Machine Learning approaches. In the context of Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), we gain detailed insights, assign these to existing strategies, and measure how strongly which participant influences the regulation. STUDY DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: We use tri-gram analysis, sentiment analysis, and similarity analysis as methods to obtain insights into the political commentary process of European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) drafts dealing with SFDR. FINDINGS: Our metadata helps to identify stakeholders and lobbying strategies. We found that the most negative comments came from the regulated, who argued strongly subjectively in a very objective environment of ESG disclosure. We also identified typical lobbying strategies based on arguments, persuasion, and classic cost-benefit considerations. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: We generate emotion values and synthesise detailed argument differences and show that modern algorithms can contribute to the identification of interest groups and lobbying strategies. Furthermore, we generate similarity values of arguments that can be taken into account in the analysis of the success of a lobbying strategy.

Mapping the Lobbying Footprint of Harmful Industries: 23 Years of Data From OpenSecrets.

Policy Points Our research reveals the similarities and differences among the lobbying activities of tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and ultraprocessed food industries, which are often a barrier to the implementation of public health policies. Over 23 years, we found that just six organizations dominated lobbying expenses in the tobacco and alcohol sectors, whereas the gambling sector outsourced most of their lobbying to professional firms. Databases like OpenSecrets are a useful resource to monitor the commercial determinants of health. CONTEXT: Commercial lobbying is often a barrier to the development and implementation of public health policies. Yet, little is known about the similarities and differences in the lobbying practices of different industry sectors or types of commercial actors. This study compares the lobbying practices of four industry sectors that have been the focus of much public health research and advocacy: tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and ultraprocessed foods. METHODS: Data on lobbying expenditures and lobbyist backgrounds were sourced from the OpenSecrets database, which monitors lobbying in the United States. Lobbying expenditure data were analyzed for the 1998-2020 period. We classified commercial actors as companies or trade associations. We used Power BI software to link, analyze, and visualize data sets. FINDINGS: We found that the ultraprocessed food industry spent the most on lobbying ($1.15 billion), followed by gambling ($817 million), tobacco ($755 million), and alcohol ($541 million). Overall, companies were more active than trade associations, with associations being least active in the tobacco industry. Spending was often highly concentrated, with two organizations accounting for almost 60% of tobacco spending and four organizations accounting for more than half of alcohol spending. Lobbyists that had formerly worked in government were mainly employed by third-party lobby firms. CONCLUSIONS: Our study shows how comparing the lobbying practices of different industry sectors offers a deeper appreciation of the diversity and similarities of commercial actors. Understanding these patterns can help public health actors to develop effective counterstrategies.

Lobbying by omission: what is known and unknown about harmful industry lobbyists in Australia.

What is unknown about commercial lobbying is far greater than what is known. These omissions distort our understanding of the extent and nature of business influence on politics. Especially when businesses engage in practices that harm health, it is crucial for public health advocates to understand corporate lobbying to counter its influence. Our study proceeded in three phases. First, based on an international audit, we developed a list of the categories of information about lobbying that could be disclosed under four groups (lobby firms, lobbyists, organizations and activities) and benchmarked Australian lobbyist registers against this list. Second, we manually extracted data from lobbyist registers in eight jurisdictions, cleaned the data and created a relational model for analysis. Finally, we classified a sample of organizations as public health organizations or harmful industries to compare their activities. We identified 61 possible categories of information about lobbying in international lobbyist registers. When applied to Australian lobbyist registers, Queensland covered the widest range of categories (13, 21%), though many lacked detail and completeness. Australian lobbyist registers provided data on 462 third-party lobby firms across Australia, currently employing 1036 lobbyists and representing 4101 organizations. Several of these represented harmful industries, with gambling interests hiring the most third-party lobby firms. Ultimately, Australian lobbyist registers do not provide enough information to understand the full extent of lobbying activities taking place. Political transparency is important for public health actors to be able to monitor corporate political activity and to protect policy-making from vested interests.

Addressing the influence of the alcohol industry in Aotearoa New Zealand.

Alcohol legislation in Aotearoa New Zealand has not been sufficient to minimise the harm and inequities caused by alcohol use, and a comprehensive review of alcohol policies has been postponed. Because of the alcohol industry's vested interests, the World Health Organization notes that industry involvement in public health policy has potential risks that should be minimised. Here we illustrate the significant extent of alcohol industry penetration in Aotearoa and how such influence undermines equity by amplifying the harms of colonisation. The government lacks policies that limit interactions with the alcohol industry, such as political donations and lobbying. We recommend what can be done to limit alcohol industry influence in policymaking, including using experiences in tobacco control to manage conflicts of interest, strengthening rules over political donations and lobbying, enhancing transparency of interactions, promoting non-collaboration with the alcohol industry and advocating for alcohol policies that give effect to Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Commercial lobbying and political contributions: an Australian scoping review.

OBJECTIVE: Many of the most effective and equitable policies to reduce the burden of non-communicable diseases threaten the interests of powerful corporations. A first step for public health advocates seeking to challenge powerful corporate interests is to understand the nature and extent of corporate political practices. This scoping review explored public health research on two political practices in Australia: lobbying and political donations. METHODS: We searched six databases, two Google Advanced searches and 11 Australian public health websites. We screened 2866 documents in total, and extracted information about political practices, industry actors and datasets. RESULTS: 62 studies published between 1980 and 2021 were identified, analysing public health advocacy, policy submissions, direct engagement with government representatives and political donations. We extracted data from 14 studies that focused on direct engagement and/or political donations. Most focused on 'unhealthy commodity industries.' CONCLUSIONS: Analysis of lobbying and political contributions in Australia is a nascent but expanding area of public health research. We discuss opportunities for future research to strengthen the evidence base and support public health advocacy to counter harmful corporate practices and promote and protect population health. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH: Countering powerful commercial interests requires greater investment in understanding corporate political activities.

Government scraps the Kept Animals Bill - so what next?

Unfortunately, despite extensive lobbying of ministers and MPs, and a commitment from the government to deliver the Kept Animals Bill, it has now been announced that the bill will be scrapped.

Aiding empirical research on the commercial determinants of health: a scoping review of datasets and methods about lobbying.

BACKGROUND: To support public health researchers and advocates seeking to challenge the influence of powerful commercial actors on health, it is necessary to develop a deeper understanding of corporate political activities. This project explores political science scholarship analysing lobbying to identify new datasets and research methods that can be applied to public health and stimulate further research and advocacy. METHODS: We undertook a systematic scoping review of peer-reviewed and grey literature reports analysing the practice of lobbying. Titles and abstracts of 4533 peer-reviewed and 285 grey literature reports were screened, with 233 peer-reviewed and 280 grey literature reports assessed for eligibility. We used a two-stage process for data extraction. In stage 1, we collected two pieces of information from all included studies: data sources and indicators used to measure lobbying. For the second stage, data extraction was limited to 15 studies that focused on meetings. RESULTS: The most common indicators used to measure lobbying activity were: registrations of active lobbyists; expenditure on lobbying; meetings; written comments and submissions made to government consultations; bills; and committee participation. A range of different data sources were used to analyse lobbying, including from governments, not-for-profits and commercial sources. All 15 studies analysing lobbyist meetings were from high-income contexts. The studies analysed three key variables: the types of government actors targeted by lobbying; the policies of interest; and the lobbyists and/or their clients. The studies used a range of taxonomies to classify policy issues and the types of actors engaged in lobbying. All studies discussed challenges with accessing and analysing lobbying data. CONCLUSIONS: There is enormous potential for public health research and advocacy concerned with commercial lobbying to learn from political science scholarship. This includes both conceptual frameworks and sources of empirical data. Moreover, the absence of good quality transparency internationally emphasises the importance of advocacy to support policy change to improve the quality of political transparency to make it easier to monitor commercial lobbying.

The effects of lobbying on the FDA's recall classification.

BACKGROUND: The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates goods accounting for 20% of US consumers' total expenditure. The agency's potential susceptibility to corporate lobbying and political influence may adversely affect the its abilities to fulfill its duties as a vital federal agency. This study assesses whether the FDA's product recall classifications in recall scenarios are influenced by firms' lobbying activities. METHODS: The universe of all FDA recalls between 2012 and 2019 is obtained from the FDA's website. Firm names are matched to federal-level lobbying data obtained from the Center for Responsive Politics - a non-profit and nonpartisan organization that tracks lobbying expenditures and campaign contributions. Analyses are conducted using ordinary-least-squares regressions, in which the dependent variable is recall classification and independent variables are three different measures of firms' lobbying activities in the one year prior to the recall. RESULTS: Firms that engage in lobbying appear more likely to receive favourable classifications from the FDA. When examining the above results by product type, we find that classification of food recalls seems to be subject to lobbying influence, but the same does not appear to be true for drug and device recalls. Evidence is consistent with the conjecture that the distinction between medical and food firms may be a result of medical firms targeting lobbying efforts at FDA approvals, rather than recalls. CONCLUSIONS: Between 2012 and 2019, the FDA's product recall classifications seem to be significantly influenced by firms' lobbying activities. Lobbying firms appear to have received more favorable (i.e., less severe) recall classifications compared to non-lobbying firms.

How tobacco companies use the revolving door between government and industry to influence policymaking: an Australian case study.

Objectives and importance of the study: The study investigates and documents how tobacco companies are using the revolving door between government and industry as a tactic to try to influence public health policymaking in Australia. This is the first Australian study to systematically investigate the revolving door tactic in tobacco lobbying and highlights the importance of strengthening integrity and transparency legislation and oversight bodies to eliminate the political influence of tobacco companies in Australia. STUDY TYPE: Mixed-methods including non-experimental descriptive and exploratory case studies. METHODS: To build a picture of tobacco lobbying through the revolving door in Australia, data was triangulated from multiple publicly available sources: 1) Australian federal, state and territory government lobbyist registers, 2) the online social networking platform, LinkedIn; and 3) Australian news media reports. RESULTS: Tobacco companies lobby the Australian government using 'in-house' employees, lobbyists working in firms acting on their behalf, and third-party allies with common interests. Almost half (48%) of internal tobacco company lobbyists had held positions in the Australian government (state, territory and/or federal) before or after working in the tobacco industry. Likewise, 55% of lobbyists acting on behalf of tobacco companies had held government positions before or after working as a lobbyist. In-house tobacco industry lobbyists, as well as those working on behalf of tobacco companies within lobbying firms, were found to have held senior governmental positions, such as a Member of Parliament (MP) or Senator, chief or deputy chief of staff, or senior advisor in a ministerial office, and many had moved into or out of government within 1 year of working for a tobacco company (56%) or as a lobbyist (48%). CONCLUSIONS: Tobacco companies are strategically using the revolving door between the government and the tobacco industry as a key political lobbying mechanism to try to influence public health policy in Australia.

Distilling the distillers: examining the political activities of the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States.

BACKGROUND: Understanding of the alcohol industry's means of influencing public policy is increasingly well established. Less is known, however, about the specific organisations that lead the political strategies of the alcohol industry. To fill this gap, this paper explores the Distilled Spirits Council of the United States (DISCUS), a key trade association in the United States (US), which also operates internationally. METHODS: This study explores how DISCUS is organised and the main political activities it pursues to advance its policy interests. The study triangulates data from several sources, including DISCUS documents, as well as federal lobbying and election expenditure data. RESULTS: This study demonstrates that DISCUS is a key political actor in the US and global alcohol policymaking context. There are identifiable strategies used by DISCUS to shape alcohol policy debates, including framing and lobbying. We also find key synergies between these strategies and identify their operation at varying levels of policy decision-making. CONCLUSIONS: Generating more secure inferences about the nature of the alcohol industry's efforts to advance its interests, and with what success and at what cost, requires researchers to investigate other trade associations in different contexts, and use other data sources.

Lobbying update: CCTV in slaughterhouses.

Megan Knowles-Bacon, BVA policy officer, gives an update on BVA's response to a Welsh consultation on CCTV in slaughterhouses.

A proposal for systematic monitoring of the commercial determinants of health: a pilot study assessing the feasibility of monitoring lobbying and political donations in Australia.

BACKGROUND: The commercial determinants of health include a range of practices to promote business interests, often at the expense of public health. Corporate political practices, such as lobbying and campaign donations, are used to influence policy makers and foster a political and regulatory environment conducive to business interests. Despite recognition of their public health importance, thus far there are relatively few efforts to systematically monitor commercial political practices. METHODS: A pilot study was conducted to explore the feasibility of systematically monitoring two political practices - lobbying and political contributions - for 'harmful industries' (alcohol, gambling, ultra-processed food and tobacco industries) in Australia. Potential data sources were reviewed to compare data availability and detail. Two publicly available datasets were selected for the pilot: ministerial diaries for New South Wales and annual donor filings from the Australian Electoral Commission. Google Data Studio was used to analyse and visualise findings.  RESULTS: The pilot study resulted in the creation of several interactive charts and dashboards that supported analysis and interrogation of the data. These charts helped to easily convey the volume of lobbying and political donations, as well as changes over time. For example, we found that between July 2014 and December 2020, NSW ministers had 20,607 meetings, of which 634 meetings were with harmful industries. And between 1998 and 2020, a total of $576,519,472 disclosed donations were made to political parties and other entities, of which $35,823,937 were from harmful industries. CONCLUSIONS: Opportunities to develop a program to monitor commercial political practices face several challenges including access barriers arising from poor availability and detail of data, technical barriers arising from the format of data disclosures and coding challenges arising from the diverse nature of the commercial sector. Despite these challenges, our pilot study demonstrates the potential to implement a monitoring program and to expand its scope to other commercial determinants of health.